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I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) gained momentum in the late
1970s at the same time that scholars world-wide were beginning to examine
problems of access to justice.1 Although ADR has continued to grow in
prominence during the past two decades, the incipient access to justice
movement appears to have withered away. Nonetheless, the two issues
remain linked in complex ways. The linkages reveal differing views of
justice and raise difficult challenges for legal policy about mediation that
are the concerns of this Essay.
Early critiques of mediation and ADR challenged these informal
processes as "second class justice." 2 From this perspective, mediation
programs were largely aimed at the poor and disadvantaged, diverting them
away from courts where they had rights and where procedural protections
gave them a chance to prevail against more advantaged parties. This
critique relies on a view of justice as the vindication of legally defined
rights through formal and public procedures. Legal policies 3 that block
access to courts where those rights presumably are vindicated thus demand
scrutiny. Mediation programs are particularly suspect when they are
mandatory and when mediation imposes costs on participants that may
diminish their capacity to pursue litigation.
However, at the same time, and as part of the broad examination of
* Craig A. McEwen is the Daniel B. Fayerweather Professor of Sociology at
Bowdoin College. Laura Williams is the Coordinator of Mediation Studies at The Ohio
State University College of Law.
1 See generally ACCEss TO JUSTICE (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978).
2 See JONATHAN B. MARKS ET AL., DisPuTE RESOLUTION IN AMEUCA 51-52
(1984) (reviewing commentary making this argument); Richard L. Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risks of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1402 (discussing the risk of prejudice in ADR);
Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American
Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 THE PoLrics OF INFORMAL JUsTICE 167 (Richard L.
Abel ed., 1982).
3 As used in this Article, the term "legal policies" will refer to laws, regulations,
local rules and contractual clauses.
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access to justice, some scholars and practitioners have challenged the
presumptions of rights-based notions of justice. 4 In doing so, they have also
raised questions about the capacity of courts and formal adjudicatory
processes to deliver justice. From these perspectives, justice entails
empowerment of individuals to shape decisions about their own lives and
conflicts on terms that are meaningful to them. The standards for decisions
are not necessarily legal rights and entitlements, and the procedures for
empowerment typically are informal rather than formal ones with
procedural safeguards. From this viewpoint, the central issue of access to
justice involves access to a process like mediation, not to courts. It is in
mediation, in this view, where disputants presumably have the power to
participate actively, and to decide outcomes and the criteria for them
themselves.
Differing views of justice and of the best forums for achieving it thus
suggest the possibility of divergent approaches to legal policies concerned
both with access and mediation. Analysis of these policies is further
complicated by observations of the ways that parties perceive and use
varying disputing processes and the manner in which they actually work.
Indeed, the access to justice movement arose because of the observation
that in practice courts are often costly and slow, intimidate and confuse
parties by their formal procedures, may advantage parties with resources
and experience and deliver outcomes that seem not to reflect the interests or
values of any of the parties. 5 Further, there is substantial evidence that
many people with legal needs or problems do not pursue them through the
4 See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FoLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994) (describing the process of mediation as a transformative one); Deborah M.
Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1997); Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985)
(criticizing the "caricaturization" of ADR); Sally E. Merry, Albie M. Davis:
Community Mediation as Community Organizing, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF
MEDIATORS 245 (Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds., 1994) (discussing Davis's vision of ADR
as an opportunity for party empowerment).
5 Such observations were articulated by Roscoe Pound in The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with Administration of Justice, 35 F.R.D. 273 (1906). See also Mauro
Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make
Rights Effective. A General Report, in 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 10; Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 525, 561 (1974).
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law at all. 6 Yet, we also have evidence that parties to disputes are often
reluctant to undertake mediation, even if it is available at no charge to
them. 7 At the same time, substantial research evidence suggests that parties
are more likely to view mediation as "procedurally just" and satisfying
when compared with adjudication or other settlement processes.8 When we
ask, thus, not only about idealized visions of courts and of mediation, but
also about how they actually work in practice, we find evidence that bears
importantly on the meaning of access and of legal policies to promote it in
its multiple meanings.
Many-but not all-of the questions about access to justice revolve
around the extent and nature of public funding of mediation. These
questions in turn have to do with our conception of the public justice
system. If adjudication provides the single model for justice, then the public
justice system should provide the opportunity to present a case to a judge at
a minimum cost to parties. The current public justice system seems to rely
on this model-even if it falls short of realizing it in practice-by imposing
modest entry costs through filing fees on parties undertaking lawsuits and
presumably thereby providing them access to judicial determination of their
controversies. Frank Sander offered another model of the public justice
system, that of the Multi-Door Courthouse, in which a single entry fee
provides access not only to adjudication but also to other processes
including mediation and arbitration.9 If the alternative processes demand
less reliance on expensive legal counsel, then they may in fact diminish cost
barriers to access to justice. At the same time, providing alternatives to
6 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'Y Rv. 525, 561 (1980-1981). See
generally BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT
OF A NATIONAL SURvEY (1977).
7 See Wayne D. Brazil, Institutionalizing Court ADR Programs, in EMERGING
ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 122-124 (1991); David E. Matz, Why
Disputes Don't Go to Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 3, 3 (1987); Sally E. Merry &
Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST.
SYs. J. 151-152 (1984). See generally Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn,
Examining a Paradox of Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 23 (1993).
8 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE §§ 4:06-4:08 (2d ed. 1994); Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of
Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service
Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259, 267 (1996).
9 See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 130-
132 (1976).
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courts at low or no cost to parties requires either public funding or donation
of dispute resolution services.
This Article takes up each of these issues in greater detail. Part H
reviews legal policies that decrease access to mediation. Part III examines
legal policies regarding mediation that limit party access to the courtroom.
In Part IV, this Article reviews policies which overcome barriers to access.
Part V briefly explores some of the issues surrounding the public costs of
access to justice. In conclusion, this Article argues for a carefully crafted
balance in legal policies that may promote meaningful access to mediation
while not posing burdens on parties that prevent appropriate use of the
courts.
II. WHAT LEGAL POLICIES PREVENT ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN/OR
THROUGH MEDIATION?
Many would argue today that mediation provides "first class justice"
and that an increasingly important issue of access revolves around the
availability of mediation, 10 especially to low and moderate income
disputants." When we view the problem of access this way, we have a new
angle of approach to legal policies about mediation. This perspective is
made more complex when we recognize that mediation takes many
different forms, some of which may do more to provide parties with a
sense of justice than do others.12 The variability of mediation leads us to
ask whether legal policy should be attentive not to access to mediation in
general, but rather to access to particular kinds of mediation that do more
to enable parties to participate actively in the resolution of their own
disputes.
Costs to parties pose the clearest barrier to access to mediation, just as
10 For related discussion of the use of mediation, see Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A.
McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct
and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 831 (1998).
11 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Costs of Mediation: Whose Responsibility?, 15
MEDIATION Q. 5, 23 (1997).
12 For general discussion and commentary about variations in mediation, see Lela
P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 937 (1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediator's Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7
(1996); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediation Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. RnV. 985 (1997).
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they create the most obvious barrier to formal law and courts. However,
other less obvious barriers exist as well. Some legal rules may have the
indirect effect of increasing the cost of mediation or diminishing the
diversity of mediator pools and thus accessibility to mediation by various
groups. Rules that make mediation voluntary rather than compulsory may
also diminish access indirectly, as do rules and programs that tie eligibility
for mediation to prior initiation of a lawsuit. Finally, when mediation
develops in ways that make lawyers, not parties, the key actors in the
process, it may offer little access to meaningful participation and thus to a
sense of justice.
Legal policies that bear on the costs of mediation and who pays them
play a significant role in access. The potential of cost barriers is indirectly
heightened by policies that produce reliance on the private marketplace for
mediation services rather than either public provision or volunteer service.
The costs of mediators' services, and thus the barriers they pose to access,
would also seem likely to be increased by legal policies that set highly
restrictive qualifications for mediators. 13 For example, Alfini describes
Florida's experience with mediation and makes clear that the highest party
costs for mediation are borne in circuit court civil cases, in large part
because certified mediators are uniquely limited in such cases to
experienced lawyers or retired judges.14 Restrictive qualifications may also
narrow the diversity of mediators and promote cultural and linguistic
barriers to mediation.15
In practice, the cost barriers to mediation presumably vary according to
the type of case and the relative expense of mediation in relation to the total
transaction costs of parties in litigation as well as to the amounts of money
that may be in dispute. For many commercial litigants, for example, the
marginal costs of mediation may be relatively low. For private litigants and
for contingent fee lawyers representing parties in "ordinary litigation," 16
however, the costs of mediation may weigh more heavily. For parties
13 See generally Rogers & McEwen, supra note 10.
14 James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 53, 56-59 (1991).
15 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 8, § 6:09; Bruce E. Barnes, Conflict
Resolution Across Cultures: A Hawaii Perspective and a Pacific Mediation Model, 12
MEDIATION Q. 117, 117-118 (1994).
16 For example, Kritzer reported that over half of state civil suits involved stakes
(perceived by lawyers) under $5000. See HERT M. KRnzER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDiNARY LITIGATION 20 (1991).
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engaged in a divorce that may cost $1500 per person for attorney's fees, an
additional $500 or $1000 for mediator's fees could impose a substantial
burden. It would be an even greater burden for many of the apparent
majority of divorcing parties that either choose not to or cannot afford to
employ legal counsel. 17 In small claims cases, parties would have little
incentive to pay for mediation costs that could easily match or exceed the
amounts of money at stake. Moreover, making mediation available at
market rates presumably will do little to provide access to some forum for
resolving disputes for the many people who find the formal legal system
inaccessible because of cost. Thus, the costs of mediation are likely to have
varying impacts on access to mediation for different kinds of cases.
Additionally, legal rules that emphasize voluntary use of mediation can
reinforce barriers to access. While one party can force another to respond
to a lawsuit, in the absence of a mandate to use mediation, one party cannot
require the other to sit down to talk about settlement. There are many
barriers to negotiation that may prevent one or both parties to a dispute
from initiating or engaging the process meaningfully.' 8 While mediation
can help overcome most of these once it is underway, these barriers often
make parties reluctant to initiate mediation. Wayne Brazil, for example,
argues that inertia, overload of cases, inattention to planning negotiation,
strategic concerns about appearing weak and attorney fears about loss of
control over the case work against voluntary participation in mediation. 19
Mandatory mediation overcomes these barriers to entry without
substantially reducing the likelihood of settlements or party satisfaction with
the process.20
Further limits to access arise if publicly supported mediation becomes
available only after the initiation of a lawsuit. For parties unwilling or
unable to undertake formal legal proceedings, access to mediation is then
effectively eliminated.
17 See generally JOHN GOERDT, DIVORCE COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT, CASE
CHARACTERISTICS, AND THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 16 URBAN JuRIsDIcTIONs (1992);
Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce
Practice, 28 L. & Soc'Y REv. 149, 154 (1994).
18 See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OMO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 235 (1993)
(discussing "strategic," "principal/agent," " cognitive" and "reactive devaluative"
barriers to conflict resolution).
19 See Brazil, supra note 7, at 122.
20 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 8, § 6:04.
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Other legal policies may be implicated if we think of access not simply
in terms of the availability of any form of mediation, but more specifically
as access to a mediation process that permits active party participation in
the resolution of a dispute on their own terms. When mediation comes to
resemble settlement conferences- run by mediators rather than judges- it
may advance efficiency goals, but do very little to promote party
participation and empowerment. 21 Professor Alfini's observations of
Florida mediators in civil cases provide a vision of varying mediator styles,
including two that are suggestive of settlement work by judges.22 Despite
powerful advocacy for interest-based mediation involving parties, lawyers
often appear to strongly prefer those mediators who provide evaluations of
their cases and thereby help to pressure parties to settle.23 It appears to be
easier to identify the potential problems of access to mediation, however,
than to locate either their causes or solution in legal policies.
III. WHAT LEGAL POLICIES REGARDING MEDIATION CREATE
BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE COURTROOM?
In increasing numbers of jurisdictions across the country, the formula
for a party seeking access to justice has become some combination of
mediation and courtroom adjudication. 24 Consequently, it is not surprising
that many of the legal policies that create, shape, direct and grant access to
mediation programs also impact access to the courtroom. When barriers to
courtrooms are created, disputants may be left with the choice of access to
justice through mediation only or no choice of access to justice in any
form. For those for whom adjudication is the desired model of justice,
these barriers to access to justice in the courtroom are troubling.
21 Evidence from a study by the Rand Corporation comparing adjudication,
arbitration and settlement conferences with judges makes clear that parties find
settlement conferences the least "procedurally just," in large part because of their lack
of participation in the process. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF
JUsTICE: TORT LITIGANT's VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SErrLEMENT CONFERENCES 79 (1989).
22 Alfini describes "trashers" as those who attack each parties' legal arguments
and "bashers" as those who are not attentive to the substance of the dispute, but rather
who focus on pressuring parties to find a middle ground in dollar demands and offers
for settlement. See Alfini, supra note 14, at 66-71.
23 See id. at 62; McEwen et al., supra note 17, at 164-167.
24 See generally ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 8.
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Mediation made mandatory through laws, regulations, rules or
contractual clauses can in some instances keep parties from having their
day in court. Generally, advocates of mediation look kindly upon mandated
mediation because it brings parties and lawyers to the table to observe first
hand and to reap mediation's benefits.2 5 From a Multi-Door Courthouse
26
perspective, if a party has arrived at the mediation table, that party has the
opportunity to seek justice in one of its many forms. However, the party
who seeks a day in the courtroom, not just in the courthouse, may find that
mandated mediation under some conditions creates barriers to access.
When mediation is a prerequisite to courtroom access or to proceeding in
the courtroom past a certain point in litigation, the legal policies which
shape that mediation must be examined to ensure that mediating parties are
not blocked from ever proceeding or returning to the courtroom.
A. Financial Cost
The financial cost of mediation for the parties can create a huge
barrier, both to access to the mediation itself, as discussed in Part II, and to
access to justice in the courtroom. The financial cost of mediation may
determine whether the parties can continue on to court if the mediation
does not produce settlement. The single most important factor in
determining the parties' financial cost in mediation is whether legal policies
require that parties pay for the mediation session. Also critical to the
financial cost of the mediation for the parties is whether they wish to be
represented by counsel in the mediation and, if so, the cost of such
representation. Any administrative costs associated with mediation, such as
filing fees, also add to the cost of the mediation for the parties.
When mediation is mandatory and the parties are required to pay for
the mediation session, a barrier to access to the courtroom is created if the
total cost of going to mediation consumes a significant part of the dispute
resolution budgets of either or both parties. Faced with burdensome
mediation session costs, a party not mandated to mediation might choose to
forgo mediation and spend limited funds on courtroom adjudication.
However, going directly to the courtroom is not an option when
participation in mediation is mandated before courtroom access is allowed.
25 See generally Rogers & McEwen, supra note 10. See also text accompanying
note 20.
26 See generally Sander, supra note 9.
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Under such circumstances, the party with a limited dispute resolution
budget is pressured to settle in mediation.
Many factors determine the financial cost of the mediation session. As
discussed in Part II, legal policies that produce reliance on the private
marketplace for mandated mediation services rather than either public
provision or volunteer service tend to hike the cost. Within the private
marketplace, cost is shaped by the manner in which a mediator's time is
charged: hourly, per day or half day or per case. Legal policies that set
highly restrictive qualifications for mediators are another culprit in the
increase of the cost of mediation sessions. 27 All of these factors impact the
financial cost of the mediation sessions and therefore impact courtroom
access for parties who are required to pay for the mediation sessions.
A barrier to access to justice in the courtroom may be created when
mediation is mandatory and a party desires the representation of counsel in
that mediation. Paying attorney's fees for representation in mediation may
exhaust the dispute resolution budget that a party would have used to pay
for courtroom adjudication (such as attorney's fees for court, and time
away from employment). In such a scenario, a party is faced with a tough
choice. In order to preserve the dispute resolution budget needed to
continue on to court, the party may go to mediation without the counsel he
feels is necessary. In the alternative, the party may go to mediation with the
desired representation of counsel, but the dispute must be settled in
mediation because attorney's fees for mediation will consume the party's
dispute resolution budget.
B. Time Cost
For a party with limited time resources, a legal policy that mandates
mediation before a court may create a different barrier to access to justice
in the courtroom. If a party has time for only one justice process, and
mediation is the mandated first step to access justice, mediation becomes
that party's first and only chance for justice. If the party desires access to
justice in the courtroom, mandating mediation first creates a barrier to the
preferred form of justice.
27 See supra notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text.
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C. Settlement Pressure in Mediation
Barriers to access to justice in the courtroom are created if the parties
to a dispute are pressured, directly or indirectly, to settle the dispute in
mediation, thereby eliminating the need and the opportunity to seek justice
in the courtroom. Any attempt to avoid such settlement pressures and go
directly to court is blocked if mediation is mandatory before court access is
available.
Direct pressure to reach settlement in mediation, and therefore never to
go to court, is created when parties face penalties if the trial outcome does
not exceed by a certain amount the proposed mediation settlement. 28 Legal
policies which mandate mediation before court, combined with Michigan-
style penalty statutes which make continuing on to court a financial risk,
create a powerful incentive to accept whatever outcome can be achieved in
mediation.
Direct pressure to reach settlement in mediation may also be created by
legal policies which direct or allow the mediator to report to the trial judge
on the mediation process or to recommend a trial outcome. 29 Knowledge of
such open communication between mediator and trier of fact might
persuade a party who is considering mediation to go directly to court so as
not to risk facing a biased judge. Of course, if mediation is the prerequisite
to court, a party's access to an unbiased judge at trial is eliminated when
such communication occurs. It can be argued that access to a biased trier of
fact is not true access to justice in the courtroom.
Once again, a system in which the parties pay for the mediation session
must come under scrutiny if the cost of the session accrues other than on a
per case basis. A party who is mindful of a ticking cost meter for the
mediation session may feel pressure to settle the mediation to stop her costs
from mounting. For that party, the party-pay mandated mediation becomes
a barrier to access to justice in the courtroom.
28 See, e.g., MICH. L. CT. R. 403.15-16 (Wayne County); MICH. GEN. CT. R.
316.7. This type of pressure to settle will be referred to hereinafter as "Michigan-
style."
29 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183 (West 1994).
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IV. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO MEDIATION AND TO ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN THE COURTROOM
How can legal policies overcome barriers to mediation and to access to
justice in the courtroom? As previously discussed, legal policies that shape
mediation programs often also impact disputants' future access to justice in
the courtroom. Consequently, we must examine the effects of policies on
the mediation programs which they govern and on any future attempts by
disputants to get into court. To overcome barriers to access, legal policies
would have to address the financial and time costs of mediation, availability
of mediation prior to litigation, cultural barriers to use of mediation,
pressures against entering mediation in the course of litigation, pressures to
settle in mediation, the nature of mediation services provided and mandated
mediation. Each of these issues will be examined in turn.
If financial costs are a barrier to mediation and to the courtroom, then
limiting those costs will increase access to both forums for justice. Public
provision of mediation service at little cost obviously provides the greatest
access. For example, California counties make mediation available in
divorce cases without charge to the parties, although funding for mediation
comes from earmarked surcharges on marriage licenses.30 In Maine, small
claims mediation is provided at no charge to parties by mediators employed
contractually by a Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service (CADRES)
but is supported by a surcharge on the filing fee for all small claims
litigants. 3 ' Florida small claims courts provide mediation services through
community volunteer programs at no cost to parties. These examples of no-
fee (direct) provision of mediation occur in kinds of cases where the costs
of mediation to parties are likely to be most burdensome and create the
greatest barriers to access.
Another option is to fix the costs of mediation by providing either a
capped fee or a standard charge for its use or by establishing sliding scales
based on ability to pay. Maine charges parties $120 for divorce mediation
through CADRES and mediators are paid $50 per mediation session for
their work.32 In Hawaii and Montana, fees for mediators are established by
30 See EuzABEmH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTs OF
PROGRAM DEsIGN 46 (1992).
31 See Telephone Interview with Diane Kenty, Director of Maine's Court
Alternative Dispute Resolution Service (Jan. 16, 1998).
32 See id.
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statute. 33 In Florida circuit courts, according to Alfini, judges set the
mediation fee when they order it, usually at $125 per hour, but mediators
can set their own fees when parties seek them out voluntarily. 34
Waiver of fees for those parties who can demonstrate that their incomes
are below a certain cut-off has also been proposed as a way to deal with
cost barriers to mediation access and to postmediation courtroom access. 35
Means-testing for eligibility of free mediation services necessarily excludes
many with modest resources that do not quite qualify. Sliding scale charges
may be another mechanism for provision of mediation services. Marilyn
McKnight, for example, reports on a Minnesota program to bring divorce
mediation services to rural, low-income and culturally diverse populations
using sliding fee schedules. 36 Unlike fee waivers, these schedules are not
legally mandated, however, but reflect the commitment of local mediation
groups. Another strategy to provide mediation services to those most in
need is to require by statute or court rules that mediators who serve on
court rosters or are certified by courts offer a certain number of hours of
pro bono service. 37
Both to increase access to mediation generally and to permit use of
mediation without the necessity of court filing and referral, some states
have actively supported the development of community mediation centers
which provide mediation at limited or no fee whether parties have filed
lawsuits or not.38 It is less clear how legal policies can deal with cultural
barriers to access to mediation. Some statutes, such as the California law
encouraging counties to develop dispute resolution programs, indicate the
aspiration to deal with access and diversity issues: "Local resources,
including volunteers reflective of the diversity of the community and
available public buildings should be utilized to achieve more accessible,
cost-effective dispute resolution." 39 The transformation of such aspirations
33 See HAw. REV. STAT. § 672, 673 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-203
(1993).
34 See Alfini, supra note 14, at 58.
35 Diane Kenty reports that for budgetary purposes she estimates that 10% of
divorce mediations will involve a waiver of the modest ($120) mediation fee. See
Telephone Interview with Diane Kenty, supra note 31.
36 See Marilyn McKnight, Access to Mediation Services for Rural, Low-Income,
and Culturally Diverse Populations, 15 MEDIATION Q. 29, 40 (1997).
37 See Kovach, supra note 11, at 23.
38 See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW § 849 (McKinney 1985).
39 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465(c) (West 1990).
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into practice may come through funding decisions that tie resources to local
program efforts to achieve such goals in practice. However, such local
achievements could easily be blocked by legal policies that set qualification
standards that effectively diminish the diversity of mediator pools. Further
efforts to deal with barriers to access arising from cultural differences in
views of disputing may best be dealt with, not by legal rules, but by the
implementation of mediation training and adaptation of mediation
approaches to reflect the needs of diverse groups in local communities.40
Mandatory mediation is both friend and foe to access to justice. Legal
policies supporting mandatory mediation promise to enlarge access to
mediation, while at the same time creating certain barriers to access to the
courtroom raised in Part I of this Article. Clearly, a careful balancing of
conceptions of access is necessary in making decisions about mandatory
mediation.
Mandatory mediation increases the use of mediation, 41 in part by
overcoming social psychological and strategic barriers to undertaking the
process. 42 For example, parties who are reluctant to initiate settlement
discussions for fear of showing weakness may find a mandate to use
mediation provides them access to a process they could not easily enter on
their own. At times, one party can hold the other hostage by refusing to
enter into serious negotiation. Mandatory mediation can at least bring the
parties to the table under such circumstances.
Mandatory mediation decreases access to courtroom justice when
combined with some program features such as the requirement that the
parties pay for the mediation, or direct pressures to settle the dispute in
mediation. The fact that mediation is mandated before access to court is
allowed can create time costs for a party that make continuing on to court
impossible. Solutions that allow for an opt-out from mandatory mediation
effectively reduce access to mediation, however.43 Therefore, it is
preferable to develop options that open up access other than by allowing
parties to opt-out of mandatory mediation because of cost concerns. The
suggested solutions to financial barriers to access, discussed above,
preserve access to mediation in such situations.
Barriers to courtroom access that are created when pressures to settle
40 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 15, at 118.
41 See generally Rogers & McEwen, supra note 10.
42 See Mnookin, supra note 18, at 238.
43 See Thomas W. Weeks, Legal Service Providers and Dispute Resolution: A
Conversation, Disp. REsOL. MAG., Fall 1995, at 3 (1996).
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are strong in mandated mediation can be eliminated by removing the direct
settlement pressure. Mediation is not a fair process when strong settlement
pressures effectively remove a disputant's choice of whether or not to
settle. 44 Certainly any court caseload-reduction benefits of Michigan-style
mediation are far outweighed by the gross unfairness of forcing a party in
mediation to take a huge financial gamble if she wishes to access justice in
the courtroom. Gross unfairness, as well as a subversion of the essence of
mediation, exists in a mediation program where the mediator reports to and
influences the trier of fact if the case continues on to the courtroom.
Elimination of these direct pressures to settle eliminates a barrier to access
to the courtroom. However, in programs where these settlement pressures
remain, the barriers to courtroom access could be reduced if the mandate
were flexible and allowed an opt-out from mediation. Parties then could
make a choice between mediation or the courtroom. While this solution
would satisfy a party desirous of courtroom access, a party wishing to use
mediation still would be left with access to a tainted mediation process.
Parties with limited time resources which permit participation in only
one justice process are denied courtroom access when mediation is
mandated before court. Flexibility in the mandate is the only solution to this
barrier to access. An exception to a mandatory mediation requirement
which creates a good cause opt-out would give a party with limited time
resources the opportunity to petition for her preference of justice in the
courtroom. 45
Legal policies may be directed not only at opening up access to
mediation, but also at shaping the character of the mediation process itself.
On the one hand, some states like Kansas permit mediators to "allow only
the parties to attend the mediation sessions," presumably in order to
highlight their participation and to prevent lawyers from dominating the
process. 46 Research evidence from the divorce context challenges the
assumption that lawyers will necessarily "spoil" mediation for the parties
although Lande argues that it may be true under some circumstances. 47
44 See generally Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. REsOL. 909 (1998).
45 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-311(1) (1997).
46 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (1995); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182
(1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(10)(a) (1993); FLA. R. Civ. P. § 1.720(d) (West
Supp. 1998).
47 See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317, 1364
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However, as noted earlier, restrictions on lawyer participation may also
create pressures to settle that effectively limit access to adjudication. Given
the important balancing between fairness and access to a party-controlled
mediation process, exclusion of lawyers is neither necessary nor
appropriate as a way to achieve access.
A second approach to shaping the character of the mediation process by
legal policy has been taken recently by Florida, which prohibits certified
and court-appointed mediators from giving opinions as to "how the
court... will resolve the dispute." 48 It is not clear what effects, if any,
that efforts to prevent evaluative mediation have on the practice of
mediation. However, prohibitions of evaluations would be difficult to
enforce, especially if lawyers participating in mediation expect and value
views of the merits of cases by mediators. These views could easily be
disclosed as the views of the mediator, not predictions of judicial decisions.
Efforts to shape the content of mediation by rule conflict with aspirations to
leave mediation as free from constraint as possible, so as to encourage
flexibility and creativity in the process. Although the form of mediation is
important to the experience of justice by the parties, legal policy is not the
instrument to shape the form mediation takes.
V. PUBLIC COSTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Insuring access to justice is a costly proposition, whether that access is
to the courts or to mediation. But who will bear those costs?49 The options
appear to be limited to: users of mediation services, potential users,
taxpayers generally or mediators through volunteer service. Reliance on
volunteers or on broadly or narrowly defined user fees diminish or
eliminate the costs of mediation borne by the general taxpayer. The clear
balance that needs to be struck is between universal access paid for out of
tax dollars-perhaps an unrealistic aspiration in today's political climate-
and a private market where only those with substantial resources can find
(1995). But see John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 903, 925 (1997).
4 8 FLA. STAT. ANN. MEDIATOR R. 10.090(d) (West 1997). But see IND. CODE
ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-19 (West Supp. 1997) (taking the opposite position by permitting
mediators to evaluate cases).
49 For discussions of funding mediation programs, see generally ROGERS &
MCEWEN, supra note 8, § 6:34; Kovach, supra note 10; Frank E.A. Sander, Paying for
ADR, 78 A.B.A. J. 105 (1992).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
mediation services.
The public costs of mediation are minimized when parties are required
to pay the price of the service. At one extreme, that means reliance on an
unregulated private marketplace, but in practice it may mean some fee
capping as in Florida. We have seen the potential risks that such strategies
pose to access both to courts and to mediation.
Fewer concerns about access to mediation arise when some large group
of potential users pays surtaxes into a fund dedicated to providing
mediation services. Thus, California and Florida counties are authorized by
law to add surcharges to civil filing fees in order to fund mediation
programs. 50 California spreads costs even further by creating a surcharge
on marriage license applicants to fund divorce mediation.51 When
surcharges are small, they probably have little effect on limiting access, but
when they are larger (e.g., Florida charges up to $45 for a petition for
modification of a final divorce judgment)52 concerns about limiting access
increase.
Reliance on volunteers is another way to minimize costs to the public
while increasing access to mediation. Community mediation programs,
many of which deal with small claims cases and take other court referrals,
typically rely heavily on volunteers, although they still require substantial
resources for training and administration. New Hampshire has operated a
mandatory alternative dispute resolution requirement in its civil courts for
five years, relying on lawyer volunteers to provide neutral evaluation,
mediation and arbitration services. 53 The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals relies on a pool of lawyers to provide volunteer mediation
services. 54
Like fees, volunteer service falls along a continuum, from entirely
unpaid mediators to those who may receive modest or token compensation.
For example, for small claims cases, Maine utilizes mediators who are not
quite volunteers-instead, they provide their services at very low fees, $50
a half day. 55 The Northern District of Ohio combines pro bono with capped
50 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 470.3 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.108
(West 1998).
51 See generally PLAPINGER & SHAw, supra note 30.
52 See FLA. STAT. ANN § 44.108(c) (West 1998).
53 See N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170 (1992).
54 See Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, Report of Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards,
in 1995 ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE D.C. Cmcurr 28 (1995).
55 See Telephone Interview with Diane Kenty, supra note 31.
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fee service, providing free service of volunteer lawyer-mediators for up to
4.5 hours and then requiring parties to pay for additional time at the rate of
$150 per hour. 56
Such options suggest the potential for use of volunteers, but there are
limits to relying on them as well. When the demand on volunteers is
substantial, the potential for bum-out increases significantly, and the
maintenance of a high quality volunteer service over time may prove
difficult and labor intensive. Minimizing that bum-out may also involve
making few demands on volunteers, especially for training. Settlement
Week, for example, may require as little as a half day of mediation training
for their lawyer volunteers, although the lack of training may not diminish
the quality of the mediation provided.57
In addition to these practical concerns, some advocates of mediation
contend that, in principle, mediators should be paid for the work they do,
in part as a measure of the value placed by society on the enterprise and in
part as an incentive to draw into the work talented people who take it
seriously and do it well. 58 Further, some argue that parties will take
mediation more seriously if they have some financial investment in it. 59
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Access to justice has different meanings with varying and potentially
contradictory implications for legal policies regarding mediation. If access
to justice means availability of procedures to make a legal determination of
rights and obligations, it must be protected by legal policies that do not
increase burdens on parties or pressure *settlements. If access to justice
means availability of mediation to all parties, it requires legal policies that
fund mediation services and that effectively make them available to
56 See U.S. Ds'riucT CT., N.D. Omo R. 7:1.4(c)(1) (1996).
57 Settlement Weeks typically are arranged by courts once a year and bring in large
numbers of lawyer volunteers to mediate civil cases, especially ones that have long been
on the docket. See CHARLES PADDOCK, SErrLEMENT WEEK: A PRACTICAL MANUAL
FOR RESOLVING CIvIL CASES (1990). Evidence from Settlement Week settlement rates
indicate that they are unrelated to the amount of training of the mediator. See Roselle L.
Wissler, Mediation in Settlement Week: Empirical Research, DIsp. RESOL. MAG.
(forthcoming 1998) (on file with author). Of course, some would argue that settlement
rates tell little about the quality of mediation.
58 See Sander, supra note 49, at 105.
59 See Kovach, supra note 11, at 18.
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disputants. Since access means both, legal policies regarding mediation
should reflect a fine balance when the two views lead to opposing policies
and an effort to maximize both forms of access when they are not in
conflict, while recognizing other values as well, such as fairness, efficiency
and quality. 60
Legal policies regarding mediation must be especially attentive to the
costs of the process to participants. On the one hand, these costs may be
affected by legal policies that demand particular qualifications that narrow
the pool of available mediators and drive up their prices. If states are to
realize the goal of diverse (and low cost) rosters of mediators, care needs to
be taken to avoid setting qualifications that diminish that diversity
substantially and without significant gains for quality. Costs may also be
higher when the unregulated private marketplace becomes the sole source
of mediation services. On the other hand, policies that regulate fees,
provide public subsidies for mediation services or spread costs among a
large number of potential users help to diminish barriers to access based on
cost. Such policies also serve to diminish the burden of mediation on
parties and thus help to reduce potential limits on access to courts. In times
of scarce public resources, it is especially important to recognize that
certain kinds of cases are more likely to pose issues of access and to focus
attention on those arenas-for example, family law and small or modest
claims in civil litigation- where the cost of mediation poses the greatest
likelihood of a problem.
Our analysis of access issues suggests the need for careful balancing in
considering legal polices regarding mandates. On the one hand, mandatory
mediation creates risks of imposing burdens on parties that may diminish
access to the courts. On the other hand, mandates help overcome barriers
to the use of mediation that effectively increase access to it and implicitly
increase (or should increase) public commitment to support mediation
services. With appropriate safeguards-low cost, attorney participation, no
reports to triers of fact and appropriate opt-out provisions- mandates do
not significantly hinder access to courts while enlarging access to
mediation.
Efforts to shape the character of the mediation process itself and thus of
access to full party participation in the resolution of disputes appear not to
be amenable to control by legal policy. Here the caution is to avoid doing
harm. Efforts to keep lawyers out of mediation sessions, for example, will
60 See RoGsS & McEWEN, supra note 8, §§ 7:01-7:09.
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do little to shape the mediation process, but may do much to diminish its
fairness. Attempts to prohibit predictions of what courts will do are difficult
to enforce and seem unlikely to have much effect on the character of party
participation in mediation. Ultimately, the nature of mediation will be most
affected by the character of training and the climate of expectations for
mediators and mediation among those who run mediation programs and
those who participate in mediation sessions.

